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Paul Boghossian stages his commentary on
‘‘Cutting-Edge Equivocation’’ (CE) as an en-
counter between, on one side, himself as rep-
resentative of analytic philosophy and defender
of classical epistemology and, on the other side,
Smith as representative of ‘‘vast numbers of
scholars in the humanities and social sciences’’
and defender of a set of claims that ‘‘amount to
some species of relativism, a view about knowl-
edge that we [philosophers] believe to have been
discredited some time ago.’’ The outcome of the
encounter, as Boghossian scripts it, is a vindica-
tion of what he acknowledges as the ‘‘deaf ear’’
that he and his colleagues turn to recent work
in a number of fields concerned with cognition,
knowledge, and science. Viewed from another
perspective, however, his commentary could be
seen as an exhibition of the remarkable array of
techniques through which that self-immurement
is perfected and secured.
Two general features of Boghossian’s proce-
dure may be noted at the outset. First, to make
his commentary work to the ends just indicated,
he must ignore the greater part of research and
theory in the relevant fields of study and much
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of what is explicitly stated inCEwhile subjecting the rest—that is, what he is
aware of in those fields andwhat he notices and cites in the essay—to a series
of conflations and exceedingly strained readings. It would take many pages,
more than is proper to claim here for the purpose, to document, correct,
or disentangle every significant elision or inaccuracy in his commentary. I
shall, however, have occasion to indicate a good number of them below.
The second general feature to be noted is that, throughout his commen-
tary, Boghossian produces statements about belief, reasons, evidence, and
truth as if the meanings of those terms were transparent and the concepts
to which they refer either unproblematic or, if problematic (as in ‘‘simply to
misunderstand the sort of state that belief is’’ or what can and cannot ‘‘be
a reason for a belief ’’), then in his proprietary custody. What is significant
here is not the intellectual complacency as such, but the circularity that it
virtually guarantees. Boghossian, in what he would no doubt see as due con-
formity to intuitive, commonsense, traditional understandings, treats beliefs
as discrete true/false mental propositions, evidence and reason(s) as inher-
ently truth bearing or truth directed, and truth as, well, it’s hard to know and
he does not say, but presumably something clear and unitary. Since it is,
however, just those terms and concepts in just those traditional conceptual-
izations—along with the extensive system of interconnected assumptions
and mutually sustaining definitions, distinctions, and predications govern-
ing their standard usages and understandings—that are at issue in contem-
porary epistemological controversies, Boghossian’s deployment of them in
defense of traditional views of knowledge begs the question throughout and
confines his arguments to self-affirmation.
The oversights and conflations here are substantial. Boghossian refers to
what is shown by ‘‘even the most cursory acquaintance with the literature
to which Smith is alluding.’’ It appears, however, from his numerous mis-
taken attributions and skewed generalizations and also from the limited
range of his relevant citations that Boghossian’s own acquaintance with that
literature is little better than cursory. Any minimally adequate survey of re-
visionist theories of knowledge and science in the twentieth century would
have to take into account Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scien-
tific Fact, Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Paul Feyer-
abend’sAgainst Method, Michel Foucault’sArchaeology of Knowledge, and the
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more recent work of such practitioners of science and technology studies
as Andrew Pickering and Bruno Latour.1 If it claimed to be a genuinely in-
formed history of modern constructivist thought, it would also have to take
into account the contributions of such theorists as experimental psycholo-
gist J. J.Gibson, philosopher Nelson Goodman, theoretical biologists Hum-
berto Maturana and Francisco Varela, neuroscientists Gerald Edelman and
Antonio Damasio, cognitive scientist Edwin Hutchins, and artificial intel-
ligence/robotics specialist Rodney A. Brooks.2 As is evident to anyone ac-
quainted with the intellectual substance of this body of work, the set of
ideas, theories, analyses, and accounts reasonably assembled under the label
‘‘constructivist views of knowledge’’ cannot be even roughly summarized
as the simplistic negative thesis that ‘‘knowledge must not be thought of
as detached from its social, cultural, and political context’’ or as a norma-
tive statement about reasons or justifications for belief. And as is evident to
anyone acquainted with the range and substance of contemporary research
and theory in the sociology of science, the assertion that the ‘‘bizarre’’ (as
indeed it is) view that ‘‘we are only moved [to belief ] by our political inter-
ests’’ is ‘‘practically orthodoxy among sociologists of science’’ is either seri-
ously ignorant or seriously irresponsible. As an analytic philosopher, Bog-
hossian need not also be an intellectual historian. As an analytic philosopher
offering to justify the deaf ear turned by analytic philosophy to entire fields
of study and to what are elsewhere regarded as major intellectual develop-
ments, however, he has an obligation to do more than exhibit the conse-
quences of that deafness.
Boghossian’s conflation of constructivism, the sociology of science, the
tenets of the Strong Programme, and statements about the situatedness of
knowledge requires some minimal disentangling. The Strong Programme
is, or rather, was, a specific research program that undertook the inves-
tigation of scientific knowledge with aims, theoretical assumptions, and
methodological commitments that diverged significantly from both classi-
cal epistemology and what was thenmainstream (or ‘‘Mertonian’’) sociology
of science.3 Constructivism is not properly equated with the original tenets
of the Strong Programme or with the sociology of science more generally.
Nor is it reducible to the idea of the situatedness of knowledge stressed by
some feminist epistemologists. Conversely and most pertinently here, not
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all sociologists of science, proponents of the Strong Programme, or feminist
epistemologists subscribe to a constructivist view of knowledge. These dif-
ferences and disjunctions are important features of the intellectual situation
I discuss in CE, and the last one is a focus of considerable attention there.
Constructivism, in most informed contemporary usage of the term, refers
to a particular way of understanding the relation between what we call
knowledge and what we experience as reality. In contrast to the understand-
ing of that relation generally referred to as realism, constructivist accounts
of cognition, science, truth, and related matters conceive of the specific fea-
tures of what we experience, think of, and talk about as ‘‘the world’’ (objects,
entity boundaries, properties, categories, and so forth) not as independent
of our sensory, perceptual, manipulative, and conceptual/discursive prac-
tices but, rather, as emerging from—or as it is said, ‘‘constructed by’’—those
practices themselves. In contrast to the prevailing assumptions of classical
epistemology, constructivist accounts of cognitive processes see beliefs not
as discrete mental propositions about, or representations of, the way the
world-in-itself is but, rather, as linked perceptual/behavioral dispositions,
patterns, or routines that are continuously strengthened, weakened, and re-
configured throughout our lives by our ongoing interactions with our envi-
ronments. In contrast to referentialist views of language and positivist views
of scientific knowledge, constructivist accounts of truth conceive of it not
as a matter of a match between, on one hand, statements or beliefs and, on
the other, the autonomously determinate features of an altogether external
world (Nature or Reality) but, rather, as a situation of relatively stable and
effective mutual coordination among statements, beliefs, experiences, and
practical activities.What we call specifically scientific truth or knowledge is
seen as the especially stable and extendable product of an especially tight
mutual shaping of perceptual, conceptual, and behavioral—including ma-
nipulative, discursive, and inscriptional—practices in conjunction withma-
terial/technological projects or problems that have especially wide cultural,
economic, and/or political importance.
These ideas are not intuitively self-evident, and one would not expect an
abbreviated statement of them such as that given above to be in itself per-
suasive. It should be clear from even this brief outline, however, that con-
structivist conceptions of cognition, knowledge, and science are substan-
tive, relatively highly developed, extensive—or indeed comprehensive—in
scope, and significantly different in kind and mode from those assumed in
classical epistemology.
Reply to an Analytic Philosopher 233
Boghossian does not appear to have a sense of the order of difference in-
volved here. He does, at the end of his commentary, entertain the possi-
bility of what he calls ‘‘an entirely global skeptical challenge to [our] norms
of correct reasoning,’’ but only in order to insist that such a challenge must
either accept those norms ‘‘to get us to change our minds’’ and thus—in ac-
cord with a familiar logic—refute itself or perhaps (‘‘a deep question,’’ he
writes, alluding probably to the issue of incommensurability) stand as fun-
damentally unanswerable.4 His immediately ensuing observation, that ‘‘the
varieties of constructivism that we have been exploring are totally inade-
quate responses to the possibility of such skepticism,’’ is curious but reveal-
ing, since constructivism—as distinct from classical epistemology—does
not aim to respond to that possibility. Neither, however, does it refuse estab-
lished ‘‘norms of correct reasoning’’ or, as Boghossian seems to think, seek
to replace them with other (characteristically relativistic) norms. With re-
spect to epistemic norms, what constructivist accounts of knowledge seek
to do, rather, is offer new and arguably better ways to understand their emer-
gence and operation. Indeed, the possibility that Boghossian does not and,
I suspect, cannot entertain but which constructivism can be seen to em-
body is not a global skepticism about norms of correct reasoning but a global
alternative to the entire system of traditional rationalist understandings of
norms, arguments, correct reasoning, and the process of mind- (or belief-)
changing that Boghossian simply assumes at every point here.
The conflations, oversights, and other inaccuracies that recur in Boghos-
sian’s commentary on CE result partly from his limited knowledge of the
specific ideas I discuss there but also reflect the techniques and determined
confinements of much contemporary Anglo-American analytic philoso-
phy more generally.5 Defining itself, on one side, against the wide-ranging
speculative and discursive traditions of Continental philosophy and, on the
other side, against such (‘‘merely’’) empirical pursuits as the natural and be-
havioral sciences, analytic philosophy has taken as its field of concern what
it calls the ‘‘logical structure’’ of concepts and ideas. Its major occupations
are, accordingly, the ‘‘clarification’’ of concepts, the formal articulation and
systematization of the logical relations among prevailing ideas, and the
scrutiny of new ideas for their ‘‘coherence’’ and ‘‘intelligibility’’—meaning,
it usually turns out, their compatibility with traditional ideas.
This last-mentioned policing mission commonly involves in practice re-
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ducing some set ofmore or less heterogeneous accounts, analyses, and argu-
ments to some one-line ‘‘core idea’’ framed in the current idiom of academic
philosophy; plucking away that idea not only from the texts in which it or,
rather, its actual counterparts are articulated and elaborated but also from
the historical and institutional contexts in relation to which those counter-
parts have their intellectual significance; assigning to that boiled-down,
plucked-away, dubiously paraphrased core idea the name of some classic
‘‘ism,’’ the ‘‘strong’’ and ‘‘weak’’ versions of which are duly distinguished;
and subjecting the thoroughly processed product of these operations to a
show of logical analysis that concludes, if the original accounts, analyses,
and arguments are significantly heterodox, with a demonstration of its—
and thus presumptively their—counterintuitiveness, unintelligibility, inco-
herence, and/or decisive self-refutation. The techniques described here are
designed to ensure the formal rigor, timelessness, and cultural transcen-
dence of the analytic philosopher’s analyses and arguments and their per-
manence in logical space—which they may well do. By the same token,
however, they make likely the irrelevance of those analyses and arguments
anywhere else.
‘‘If this is even roughly what Smith has in mind—and if it is not, then I
have no idea what she has in mind. . . .’’ So it appears. Because Boghossian
confuses significantly different views and enterprises, and also because he
perceives contemporary intellectual events played out against a transhistori-
cal, otherwise vacant logical landscape, he misses or mistakes most of what
is going on in CE.
In setting up the central section of his commentary, Boghossian informs
readers that there are ‘‘two possible replies’’ to the charge that constructivist
views of knowledge ‘‘entail an unpalatable relativism’’: either that they do
not entail relativism at all or that the relativism they entail is ‘‘unobjection-
able.’’ ‘‘It is hard to figure out,’’ he continues, which of these replies ‘‘Smith
favor[s].’’ This, he explains, is because onepassage inCE suggests that I think
‘‘there is something relativistic about constructivism,’’ while in another pas-
sage I ‘‘chastise’’ feminist philosopher Lorraine Code, who (he claims) favors
the second answer, ‘‘for being overly concerned about . . . relativism.’’ But
my supposed inconsistency on the point is the product only of Boghossian’s
misreadings and textual gerrymandering.
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To begin with, nothing in the first passage Boghossian cites says anything
whatsoever about relativism. My point there, spelled out explicitly, is that
an endorsement of a constructivist epistemology/ontology is incompatible
with an endorsement of a realist epistemology/ontology and, therefore, that
a simultaneous avowal of both, as in the statement by Brian Cantwell Smith
that is the immediate referent of my observation, is an equivocation in the
common sense of the term that I supply. (It is possible, of course, that when
Boghossian sees the words ‘‘not . . . realist,’’ he believes he is seeing the
words ‘‘something relativistic.’’ Perceptual illusions of that kind are recur-
rent among intellectual traditionalists confronted by unorthodox ideas: for
example, the phrase ‘‘cannot be objectively determined’’ is read as ‘‘purely
subjective’’; the phrase ‘‘no simple opposition between’’ is heard as ‘‘just the
same as’’; or the phrase ‘‘not just a matter of transparent evidence’’ is trans-
formed in midair into ‘‘only a matter of political interests.’’) Whatever my
views, then, of the relation of constructivism to relativism, or of the num-
ber (or types) of replies one might offer to familiar charges regarding that
relation, they cannot be inferred from the passage Boghossian cites.
Second,Code does not in fact take the other-possible-answer position that
Boghossian attributes to her, that is, ‘‘that while constructivism does entail
some form of relativism, it is not of the objectionable variety.’’ On the con-
trary, insofar as Code is concerned to distinguish the relativism of her own
‘‘subjectivist’’ view of knowledge from anything sounding like an objection-
able relativism, it is from, precisely, constructivism, or at least from what she
understands as such. As I note and discuss in CE, Code seems, by way of a
common misreading of the symmetry postulate of the Strong Programme,
to associate constructivist conceptions of belief with the notion of the equal
validity of all beliefs—or, in her words, ‘‘that supreme tolerance in whose
terms all possible constructions of reality are equally worthy.’’6Accordingly,
both my correction of her erroneous understanding of constructivist views
of knowledge as implying a fatuous egalitarianism and my citation of her
essay as an example of misplaced anxiety over relativism thus understood
are proper in themselves, and neither is inconsistent with anything I say in
the first passage Boghossian cites or elsewhere in CE.
The centerpiece of Boghossian’s defense of analytic philosophy’s large
yawn at much twentieth-century thought is his supposed refutation of a set
of supposed constructivist/relativistic ‘‘options.’’ Preliminary to that opera-
tion, he insists, correctingmy alleged error, that the idea of the equal validity
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of all beliefs is not the relativism that most philosophers find objectionably
implied by constructivism. Maybe not. But it certainly is the relativism that
most of the philosophers discussed inCE—includingCode,Cantwell Smith,
John Dupré, Sandra Harding, and AlisonWylie—seem to think is objection-
ably implied by what they evidently take to be constructivism (‘‘all possible
constructions of reality . . . equally worthy,’’ ‘‘all stories . . . equally good,’’
‘‘supreme tolerance,’’ etc.) and fromwhich, accordingly, they appear anxious
to dissociate their own views. As I stress in the essay, these and other con-
temporary theorists draw that (mistaken) inference and exhibit that (mis-
placed) anxiety about constructivist reconceptions even while they appear
eager to challenge aspects of classical epistemology and mainstream phi-
losophy of science on political or other theoretical grounds, and even while
they are willing to appropriate, for political or other theoretical purposes,
challenges to the assumptions, methods, and goals of the latter (that is, clas-
sical epistemology and mainstream philosophy of science) raised by con-
structivist analyses and accounts of knowledge.7
Indeed, it is just that complex situation—its psychological and institu-
tional dynamics and what I see as its intellectual costs—that concerns me
in CE: that is, the simultaneous avowal/disavowal of constructivist or other
radically innovative views of knowledge on the part of scholars who are
themselves otherwise politically or theoretically radical (‘‘cutting-edge’’). Be-
cause Boghossian conflates constructivism with a host of other heterodox
positions, ancient and current, he cannot grasp the structure of that situa-
tion or the angle of my perspective on it. Consequently his commentary en-
gages neither the occasion nor the aim of the essay, much less its analyses
or arguments. Nor does it, I think, engage anything else substantive.
It is not irrelevant that in contesting my analysis of what I call the Egali-
tarian Fallacy, Boghossian misunderstands my sotto voce and extensively
glossed parenthesis, ‘‘equally valid (under all conditions, from all perspectives),’’
as a naive error about what philosophers think relativism is. For my point,
made explicitly there (as elsewhere), is that a rejection of the classic idea
of objectively valid belief will be seen to imply an absurd claim about the
equal validity of all beliefs onlywhen the idea of validity itself continues to be
understood along classic objectivist lines. As I observed above, constructivist
accounts of knowledge are radically and globally different from those of
classical epistemology. This means, among other things, that constructivist
understandings of even such fundamental concepts as validity, reasons, and
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beliefs are significantly different from classical understandings of themand,
no less important here, that the aims of constructivist accounts of knowl-
edge and related matters such as cognition and science are significantly dif-
ferent from the normative, justificatory aims of classical epistemology. Ac-
cordingly, Boghossian’s efforts to hold constructivist views accountable to
the assumptions, definitions, distinctions, and projects of classical episte-
mology—and to dismiss them as incoherent or ‘‘totally inadequate’’ when
so viewed—beg the question,8 earnestly but pointlessly mixing epistemo-
logical apples and anti-epistemological oranges.
As I note inCE, spectral relativistic horrors and absurdities are typically gen-
erated through the self-negation of orthodoxy.They are what issues, in other
words, when orthodox thought, using only its own conceptual resources,
tries to imagine the world without itself or itself turned upside down. The
process and its products are illustrated at a number of points inBoghossian’s
commentary, but nowheremore vividly than in the set of three totally spuri-
ous ‘‘constructivist options’’ that he brings forth from the negation of three
ideas said to ‘‘encapsulate the classical conception of knowledge.’’ Thus, dis-
playing the duly right-minded-sounding idea, ‘‘A group’s political values do
not bear on the truth of an arbitrary belief,’’ Boghossian produces, as the
corresponding constructivist option (‘‘if constructivism is to dispute some-
thing that matters to classical epistemology’’), the duly appalling-sounding
idea, ‘‘Political values do bear on whether beliefs are true.’’ Similarly, having
framed the supposedly classical (but awkward and suspiciously modern-
sounding ) idea, ‘‘Sometimes the correct causal explanation for why we be-
lieve something is that we have a reason for believing it,’’ Boghossian de-
livers, as another constructivist option, the idea that to explain a belief fully,
‘‘political values must be appealed to as well.’’ And so forth. Each of those al-
leged—and certainly, as Boghossian frames them, ‘‘bizarre,’’ ‘‘astonishing,’’
and not incidentally inflammatory—options consists of the gratuitous nega-
tion of some solemn platitude plus the substitution of political for local, his-
torical, cultural, or whatever else does or does not appear in some supposedly
constructivist source: for example, ‘‘political interests’’ as a ‘‘shorthand’’ for
SandraHarding’s ‘‘local, historical interests, values, and agendas’’ (Harding,
on her own strenuous emphasis, is no constructivist) or the alleged con-
structivist supplying of ‘‘something political’’ to close the gap between data
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and theory in Pierre Duhem’s underdetermination thesis. This parturition
of options, with their variously ‘‘subtle’’ or ‘‘extreme’’ but always ‘‘political’’
variants, finally yields the view that, Boghossian informs readers, ‘‘has tradi-
tionally gone by the name of relativism,’’ to wit: ‘‘Nothing can be a reason for
a belief . . . except relative to a particular background politics.’’ Though he
is tempted, he writes, ‘‘to be short’’ with this idea, it ‘‘needs to be addressed
separately, if only because it has had such a long history.’’ So, the old Pla-
tonic howitzer is rolled out and aimed directly at the author of CE.9 I will
return to this arresting episode below.
‘‘Can we really imagine,’’ Boghossian asks, ‘‘a way of thinking about belief
that will leave no room for [the] attitude’’ that ‘‘when we believe something,
we believe it because we think there are reasons to think it is true?’’ A tell-
ing phrase here is ‘‘leave no room for,’’ which evokes a key issue in and
for contemporary academic philosophy. The issue is how to conceive of the
relation between, on one hand, the rationalist (‘‘reasons to’’), mentalistic,
insider-perspective (e.g., ‘‘when we believe something’’), justificatory idiom
shared by traditional philosophy ofmind andmuch informal thinking about
belief—or what is sometimes called ‘‘folk psychology’’—and, on the other
hand, the naturalistic, observer-perspective (e.g., ‘‘whenmembers of a com-
munity find something credible’’), explanatory (‘‘causes of,’’ ‘‘functions of,’’
etc.) idiom of fields such as neuroscience and the sociology of knowledge.
Are the two idioms parallel, intertranslatable, incommensurable, mutually
transforming, or perhaps mutually exclusive?10 And if the idiom of one
(for example, neuroscience or sociology of knowledge) ‘‘leaves no room’’
for the idiom of the other (for example, analytic philosophy of mind or
rationalist philosophy of science), which one should be, or is likely to be,
left out in the cold? Such questions and related intellectual/disciplinary
anxieties sharpen the stakes of contemporary epistemological controversy.
They may also help account for the deaf ear turned by many (not all) ana-
lytic philosophers to work done in such fields. Of course, the burden of
Boghossian’s commentary here is that what accounts for that deaf ear are
‘‘reasons alone,’’ independent of any such cognitive/psychological dynamics
or institutional/disciplinary contexts—or, as he would put it, ‘‘background
politics.’’
Boghossian’s rhetorical question above (‘‘Can we really imagine a way of
Reply to an Analytic Philosopher 239
thinking’’ and so forth) depends for its force on the idiomatic familiarity of
the conviction it affirms, namely, that ‘‘when we believe something, we be-
lieve it because we think there are reasons to think it is true.’’ Given the evi-
dent undeniability of such convictions, is it possible even to imagine think-
ing (about knowledge, belief, reasons, truth, and so forth) otherwise? The
answer to that question is, I think, yes, but not if one imagines the ‘‘other-
wise’’ as Boghossian does here, as a mere refusal of such truisms. Infor-
mal ideas about knowing, asserting, and believing are shared widely and
change slowly among the members of any community and, for those rea-
sons, may appear fundamental, inevitable, uniform, and universal—built,
as some philosophers say, into the very ‘‘architecture of the mind’’ and, as
such, required if we are to ‘‘think of ourselves as believing and asserting at
all.’’ Nevertheless, ideas about such matters may vary significantly and have
changed, for some of us, even over the course of our lifetimes, partly in re-
sponse to research and theory in various empirical fields and partly through
the influence of ideas developed in the more intellectually mobile regions
of philosophy. Accordingly, some of us have no trouble at all thinking of
ourselves as believing and asserting, even though our more formally articu-
lated ideas of such matters are quite different from those first formulated
one hundred, three hundred, or two thousand years ago and even though
our related reconceptions of truth, reasons, and reasoning make more tra-
ditional conceptions of such ideas appear rather quaint to us and, for many
conceptual purposes, irrelevant or exceedingly cumbersome.
I return now to Boghossian’s coup de théâtre à la Plato. By way of dem-
onstrating the self-undermining of a supposed relativism-about-reasons
option for constructivism (‘‘Nothing can be a reason for a belief . . . except
relative to a particular background politics’’), he observes that such a rela-
tivism is ‘‘violated by the relativist’s own stance toward his or her own view.’’
‘‘Surely,’’ he explains, ‘‘the relativist does not think that relativism is justi-
fied only relative to his or her own perspective. If he or she did, why is he
or she recommending it to us, who do not share his or her perspective?’’
Boghossian then quotes, as ‘‘the claim central to Smith’s outlook,’’ the sen-
tence in CE that reads, ‘‘Work in all these fields has indicated the need to
review and, to some degree, revise traditional ideas and conventional wis-
dom . . . about knowledge, science, and cognitive processes,’’ and proceeds,
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via an explication of ‘‘the intended force’’ of the sentence, to expose its self-
contradictory discrepancy from what, in his view, I, as a supposed relativist
about reasons, should be prepared to say:
Clearly, this is not the assertion of someone who is prepared to say,
‘‘Relative to my political perspective, it is justified to say that recent
work has indicated the need to review and revise traditional views about
knowledge; however, if you happen not to share that perspective, you
may ignore everything I say, for I amnot claiming that it is justified rela-
tive to your perspective.’’ On the contrary, the intended force of the as-
sertion is, rather, this: Recent work has shown that conventional ideas
about knowledge are flawed, so anyone, regardless of his or her prior
commitments, who wants to believe what is true had better change his
or her mind about the nature of knowledge. If this were not the in-
tended force of the assertion, why the tone of rebuke?
Three observationsmay be offered in reply. First, the relativism that Bog-
hossian makes a show here of refuting is totally spectral and cannot be an
option for constructivism. It is not merely that no living, breathing con-
structivist happens to maintain that ‘‘nothing can be a reason for a belief . . .
except relative to a particular background politics’’ but that the rationalist
idiom, normative mode, and political idée fixe of that statement are, term
for term, clause for clause, and notion for notion, fundamentally at odds
with constructivism. Second, nothing in CE sustains Boghossian’s impu-
tation of that spectral view to me, and much of what is explicitly stated in
the essay about the relations between intellectual judgments and political
commitments indicates a very different view of these matters. Finally, Bog-
hossian’s shot from Plato’s cannon, that is, his attempted demonstration of
the purportedly self-undermining ‘‘intended force’’ and ‘‘tone of rebuke’’ of
the sentence quoted, is, to say the least, off the mark. That force and tone
would be more accurately rendered as follows:
Work in all these fields has indicated (not to everyone, of course, but tomany
people in the relevant intellectual communities) the need to review and, to
some degree, revise traditional ideas and conventional wisdom about knowledge,
science, and cognitive process. By the way, dear reader, if you happen not to
share my theoretical tastes, intellectual history, or institutional and profes-
sional concerns and agendas, I would not be surprised to learn that you
found the preceding observation—and much else in this essay—less than
immediately obvious, compelling, or even interesting. If, for example, you
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were a practicing analytic philosopher, I, givenmy views of cognitive process
(views youmay see as ‘‘relativist’’), would not be surprised to learn that you,
given what I would surmise were your theoretical tastes, intellectual his-
tory, institutional andprofessional concerns, andperhaps disciplinary sensi-
tivities, found it unpalatable, strange, highly objectionable, and, despite my
very different intentions in that regard, sounding as if delivered in a tone of
rebuke. I amnonetheless prepared to offer this and other such observations,
alongwith their amplifications and elucidations, in the pages of SAQ. For, in
accord with my views (‘‘relativistic,’’ by some definitions) of knowledge and
related matters, I expect that readers with more or less varying tastes, his-
tories, and concerns will find such observations in varying ways agreeable,
interesting, or instructive enough, and that some of those readers will pur-
sue further the lines of inquiry to which they point. Moreover, and in simi-
larly good accord with my explicit and elaborated views (constructivist, cer-
tainly; ‘‘relativistic,’’ perhaps) of cognitive process, knowledge, and related
matters, I expect that a considerable (if not vast) number of those readers,
as they begin to work with those ideas and accounts, will find them, from
their own theoretical perspectives and in relation to their own practical—
for example, professional, disciplinary, or perhaps political—agendas, more
conceptually fertile, empirically responsive, and pragmatically serviceable
than the comparable (realist, rationalist, positivist, and so forth) ideas about
knowledge associatedwith classical epistemology, preserved and formalized
inmuch analytic philosophy ofmind, and perpetuated by canonical philoso-
phy of science. At the same time, dear reader, insofar as you and I, despite
what may be the sharpness of our present intellectual and disciplinary dif-
ferences, aremembers of a broader intellectual community and, as such, ac-
knowledge certain norms of intellectual conduct and grant the significance
of heeding those norms for the continued vitality of that community, I hope
you will see the force of my concern over what I see as the currency, among
us, of a range of seriously self-confining, communally stultifying modes of
conceptual and rhetorical practice.
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